No. 07‐5 Minimally Altruistic Wages and Unemployment in a Matching Model by Julio J. Rotemberg
                                          No.  07‐5 
 
 
Minimally Altruistic Wages and Unemployment in a 
Matching Model 
 
Julio J. Rotemberg 
 
Abstract: 
This paper presents a model in which firms recruit both unemployed and employed workers 
by  posting  vacancies.  Firms  act  monopsonistically  and  set  wages  to  retain  their  existing 
workers as well as to attract new ones. The model differs from Burdett and Mortensen (1998) 
in that its assumptions ensure that there is an equilibrium where all firms pay the same wage. 
The paper analyzes the response of this wage to exogenous changes in the marginal revenue 
product  of  labor.  The  paper  finds  parameters  for  which  the  response  of  wages  is  modest 
relative to the response of employment, as appears to be the case in U.S. data and shows that 
the insistence by workers that firms act with a minimal level of altruism can be a source of 
dampened wage responses. The paper also considers a setting where this minimal level of 
altruism  is  subject  to  fluctuations  and  shows  that,  for  certain  parameters,  the  model  can 
explain both the standard deviations of employment and wages and the correlation between 
these two series over time. 
 
 
JEL Classifications: E240, J300, J640, D64 
 
Julio J. Rotemberg is William Ziegler Professor of Business Administration at the Harvard Business School and a 
visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. His email address is jrotemberg@hbs.edu. 
 
I wish to thank Mark Aguiar and participants at a seminar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston for comments.  
 
This  paper,  which  may  be  revised,  is  available  on  the  web  site  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Boston  at 
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/index.htm.  
 
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and are not those of the Federal Reserve System or 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 
 
 
This version: May 27, 2007 
 
 
Research Center for Behavioral Economics and Decision-Making 
 Job vacancies drop considerably in recessions, suggesting that recruitment costs are quite
procyclical. As emphasized by Rotemberg (2007b) in the context of the Mortensen-Pissarides
(1994) model, the procyclicality of recruitment costs implies that real wages should be much
more procyclical than they actually are. The model makes this prediction because the ease
with which ¯rms can recruit workers in recessions strengthens ¯rms' bargaining position so
that Nash bargaining between ¯rms and workers leads to substantially lower wages.
This paper departs from the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model in several respects.
First, instead of assuming that wages are determined by a bargaining process, it assumes
that ¯rms set wages unilaterally. As in Burdett and Mortensen (1998), ¯rms act somewhat
monopsonistically in the model developed here. They realize, in particular, that reductions
in their wages lead only some of their to employees to depart. In e±ciency wage terms, the
model of this paper is thus \turnover" based.1
The result of this wage-setting assumption is that, unlike in the bargaining case, em-
ployee's reservation wages no longer matter for wage determination. Instead, wages are
greatly a®ected by the way employees weigh wage and nonwage aspects of a job when de-
ciding among job opportunities. Nonwage aspects of jobs, and their role in creating job
satisfaction, are stressed in the managerial literature on \voluntary turnover," and they
also play a role in the model of Nagyp¶ al (2005) that tries to explain the magnitude of this
turnover.2
This paper also extends the canonical Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model by con-
sidering not only a speci¯cation in which ¯rms act sel¯shly but also one in which ¯rms
act somewhat altruistically. This speci¯cation is motivated by Rotemberg (2007a), which
explains ultimatum and dictator experiments with a model where people react with anger
1For a discussion of e±ciency-wage models in general and their division into models based on reducing
shirking, reducing turnover, improving selection, and increasing e®ort as a result of fairness considerations,
see Katz (1986).
2For a discussion of the managerial literature, see Price (2001). Using exit interviews from a ¯rm that
experienced a great deal of turnover, Sutherland (2002) found that most people who left this ¯rm for another
job claimed that their reason for doing so was either higher wages or the opportunity to earn more overtime.
Still, even in this case, 18 of the 48 people who left for another job reported doing so for other reasons.
One di±culty with studying the sources of quits is that, as noted by Hinrich (1975), exit interviews do not
provide the same answers as questionnaires on people's intention to quit.
1when they observe someone acting with insu±cient altruism. The underlying idea behind
this model is that people expect those with whom they interact to have a minimal level
of altruism and that, while they initially assume at least a minimally acceptable level of
altruism on the part of others, they get angry when people demonstrate a degree of altru-
ism below this minimal level. Several previous models of fairness, most notably Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) and Levine (1998), have been proposed to explain these experimental out-
comes, but Rotemberg (2007a) argues that they can do so only with implausible preference
parameters that are contradicted by other experiments. In contrast, when people's reaction
to insu±cient altruism is suitably strong, these experiments can be explained with plausibly
small degrees of altruism as in Rotemberg (2007a).3
One reason to be interested in this particular model of fairness in the labor context is
that there are numerous instances in which workers who feel mistreated spend resources
lashing out at their employer (or ex-employer in the case of wrongful termination lawsuits)
(Rotemberg 2006). Bewley (1999) provides some evidence that ¯rms are concerned about
these potential reactions. In his survey asking ¯rms why they did not cut wages in a recession,
the most common answer was that \pay cuts hurt morale and demotivate workers" (Bewley
1999, p. 174). However, the relationship may be asymmetric: Rotemberg (2006) ¯nds very
little ¯eld evidence that workers increase their e®ort when they face better-than-normal
conditions of employment.4
The model I propose should complement the literature that incorporates fair wage con-
siderations into macroeconomic models, much of which is also inspired by Bewley (1999).
This literature follows Akerlof's (1982) gift-exchange model in which workers' e®ort depends
on the di®erence between the wage they receive and a reference wage. In the application
3There is, interestingly, also direct neurological evidence for this approach. Several investigators, including
Morrison et al. (2004) show that pain-related areas of the brain become activated not only when a painful
impulse is applied to a person but also when a person sees that someone else is being subjected to this
impulse. This \mirror-neuron" response of observers turns out to depend on the altruism that the person
being observed has evinced in the past. As shown by Singer et al. (2006), the neural response of subjects
when they see someone receive an electric shock are smaller when that person has previously been observed
making a low o®er in a variant of a dictator game.
4The ¯eld experiments of Gneezy and List (2006) show that high wages motivate workers only for a very
short period of time.
2of this idea to macroeconomics, several distinct models of the reference wage have been
proposed. Danthine and Donaldson (1990) and Ch¶ eron (2002) assume that the reference
wage equals a geometric weighted average of the wage paid by other ¯rms and the level of
income received by self-employed individuals, with the latter having a weight equal to the
unemployment rate. Collard and de la Croix (2000) and Danthine and Kurmann (2004)
assume instead that past wages are also an important component of the reference wage.5
This obviously introduces additional wage stickiness. Lastly, Danthine and Kurmann (2006)
lets e®ort depend on the relationship between the wage that the ¯rm o®ers and the level of
labor productivity, on the grounds that the latter represents the ¯rm's capacity to pay. This
speci¯cation is somewhat related, though by no means identical, to Rabin (1993).
Aside from avoiding the di±cult problem of specifying reference wages, the altruism-
based model proposed here has the advantage of enabling straightforward consideration of
the limit at which workers do not impose any fairness considerations on ¯rms. It seems
harder to consider this limit in models in which e®ort depends continuously on the wage
o®ered by ¯rms. A second advantage of focusing on outcomes in which ¯rms are somewhat
altruistic towards their workers is that this approach matches the content of at least some
companies' mission statements. In the compilation of such statements in Abrahams (1995),
several companies promise to \`care" for their employees. Gibson Greetings' statement, for
example, says \We are a team... We trust, respect and care for each other" (Abrahams 1995,
p. 296.) Similarly, Tultex's statement of values tells employees \We will create, through the
contributions of each of us, a quality of worklife that is recognized by the caring, openness
and understanding of each other" (Abrahams 1995, p. 549.) In a slightly di®erent vein,
but also consistent with some form of altruism, Johnson & Johnson's corporate \credo"
reads (in part) \We are responsible to our employees, the men and women who work with
us throughout the world ...We must be mindful of ways to help our employees ful¯ll their
family responsibilities." These statements may be irrelevant, though some e®ort does appear
to go into their creation and dissemination. They may also be seen as pro¯t-maximizing
5This point of view is adopted also by Kahneman, Knetch, and Thaler (1986).
3strategies for recruiting good employees. Even in that case, the statements suggest that the
analysis of ¯rms that pretend to be altruistic may be valuable.
A ¯nal advantage of studying ¯rms that are (or pretend to be) altruistic is that it allows
one to consider a new source of wage and employment °uctuations. These variables respond,
in particular, to changes in the level of altruism required by workers. When required altruism
rises, wages rise and this leads ¯rms to curtail their employment. This force thus induces
a negative correlation between real wages and employment and thus serves to dampen the
positive correlation induced by the technology shocks considered in Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) and Shimer (2005).
Hall (2006) employs a similar device in that he assumes that there are systematic varia-
tions in the bargaining power of workers. One di®erence between the two approaches is that
Hall (2006) assumes that worker bargaining power is a deterministic function of the state of
the labor market. By letting workers have more power in a slack labor markets model, he
ensures that real wages °uctuate less in his model than they would if bargaining power were
constant. I consider instead a situation where the °uctuations in required altruism (that
induce countercyclical real wages) are not caused by changes in labor market tightness. This
has the advantage of being consistent with the relatively low correlation between wages and
employment.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Section 1 lays out the basic monopsony model without
¯rm altruism. While inspired by Burdett and Mortensen (1998), this model di®ers in that
it has an equilibrium in which all ¯rms pay the same wage. The existence of such an
equilibrium is due (in part) to the assumption that ¯rms have multiple workers and that
the marginal revenue product of labor decreases when ¯rms hire more workers. Thus, a ¯rm
with systematically high wages keeps growing by attracting new workers and thereby ¯nds
itself with more workers than is optimal. In Burdett and Mortensen (1998) this e®ect is
absent because each ¯rm can accommodate at most a single worker (and must keep its wage
high after attracting a worker because it is committed to a policy of constant wages).
Section 2 rationalizes a model with minimal ¯rm altruism and derives its equilibrium
4properties. Section 3 explains the numerical values assigned to the model's parameters
in the simulations whose results are reported in Section 4. Section 5 adds post-matching
training costs. As Silva and Toledo (2006) have shown, such training costs tend to improve
the performance of matching models when wages are set via bargaining. Training costs are
conceptually just as important when ¯rms act monopsonistically, since ¯rms can reduce their
training costs by raising wages so that employees remain at the ¯rm. Unsurprisingly, the
introduction of these costs a®ects the quantitative performance of this model as well. Section
6 concludes.
1 Basic Model
The utility of worker j when employed by ¯rm i is assumed to be
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5Using (2) and (3), it follows that the consumption index satis¯es
C
j
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j
t=¹ pt: (5)
I assume that workers neither borrow or lend. This assumption becomes more plausible if
one assumes that workers have discount rates that exceed equilibrium interest rates (so that
they would like to borrow at current rates) while also assuming that bankruptcy provisions
allow them to escape from debt obligations. The result is that no one lends to them in
equilibrium. In practice, Kenickel, Starr-McCluer, and Sund¶ en (1997) report that only
about 10 percent of U.S. households had no ¯nancial assets in 1992. Over half, however, had
no asset other than a \transactions account," and some workers may exhaust these accounts
right before they receive their paychecks.6
Since workers neither borrow nor lend, worker j's real purchases S
j
t=¹ pt equal his real
wage w
j
t when he is employed. When the worker is unemployed, his real consumption equals
the level of unemployment insurance Cu. The lack of borrowing and lending also implies
that the discount rate ½w is unimportant. The curvature parameter °, by contrast, is shown
to be important below. To further simplify the analysis, I assume that expenditures on
unemployment insurance are ¯nanced by lump-sum taxes levied on the owners of ¯rms.
For unemployed workers, the nonpecuniary compensation x can be set to an arbitrary
value xu. In the case of employed workers, an important assumption for the analysis is that
each worker expects his own x to vary over time. This variability could capture changes
in people's preferred locations. Or it could be due more generally to changes in individ-
ual tastes for the particular amenities o®ered by any particular employer. As stressed by
Nagyp¶ al (2005), this variability provides a rationale for worker mobility from job to job.
This is particularly important in the current model, because I concentrate on equilibria with
symmetric wages. When all ¯rms pay the same wage, workers who care only about wages
have no reason to change employers.
6While some borrowing, particularly \payday borrowing," seems possible even for households without
¯nancial assets, its scope may well be limited.
6The owner of ¯rm i is assumed to choose her consumption path to maximize
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where Ci
t is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator introduced above and ½ is the owner's discount rate.
The linearity of these preferences has two consequences. First, if owners can borrow and
lend at the nominal rate of interest it, it implies
1 = Et½
¹ pt(1 + it)
¹ pt+1
: (7)
This keeps owners indi®erent between consuming a unit of consumption at t and increasing
consumption at t+1 by (1+it)pt dollars. This indi®erence must hold at all t if, in equilibrium,
the consumption of owners is positive in each period. Since the wage bill is lower than the
value of all goods produced in each period, owners' Ci
t is indeed positive for all t and (7)
must hold. An even more immediate implication of assuming that the owners maximize (6)
is that ¯rms that respond to their owner's wishes use ½ to discount future pro¯ts when they
maximize the present discounted value of pro¯ts.
Firms generate revenues by giving workers productive tasks and selling the proceeds.
The output of individual ¯rm i with hi
t workers at t is ztf(hi
t). When it charges a relative
price of pi
t=¹ pt, its demand is Yt(pi
t=¹ pt)¡²t, where Yt are total ¯nal sales. Letting the ¯rm set
its price so that it sells the quantity that it has produced, its real revenues at t are thus
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This implies that the marginal revenue product of labor is
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where primes denote derivatives. The marginal revenue product of labor depends positively
on both technical progress zt and on ²t, the extent to which the product market is competitive
at time t. These variables increase labor demand at t, either by making labor more productive
or by reducing the monopolistic distortion that keeps labor demand low.
7Given the discussion above, the ¯rm's objective at time t is to maximize ¦i
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In this equation, · represents recruiting costs, while wi
t and vi
t are the real wage and the
vacancies posted by ¯rm i at t, respectively. An important assumption in (11) is that the
¯rm pays the same wage to all its workers. It is standard in turnover e±ciency-wage models
to assume that ¯rms do not know the outside opportunities available to their employees, so
it is optimal for them to pay the same wage to all their existing employees. On the other
hand, ¯rms may wish to treat new employees di®erently from existing ones. Firms with
access to the relevant information may also wish to discriminate among new hires and let
their wage depend on their previous employment status. As a ¯rst cut at the problem, I
neglect these possibilities and imagine that each ¯rm feels compelled to pay all its employees
the same wage. In a more complete model, this result might be derived from informational
imperfections and from ¯rms' desire to demonstrate their altruism.7
The dynamics of the labor market are similar to those in Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994), with the proviso that ¯rms that post vacancies attract both unemployed and currently
employed individuals, as in the job-to-job transition models of Krause and Lubik (2005) and
Nagyp¶ al (2005). Normalizing the labor force to equal one, let ht represent employment while
ut equals the number of unemployed workers. Thus
ht + ut = 1 (12)
7Levine (1993) provides evidence that the structure of wages within job ladders (that is, across seniority
for people doing similar tasks) is quite rigid. The compensation executives interviewed by Levine (1993)
were unwilling to institute signi¯cant changes in relative wages within an occupation even when they were
told that these relative wages had changed in the outside labor market. Quoting an executive, Levine (1993,
p. 1256) says \If you pay new workers more than senior ones, `You will have an employee revolt on your
hands.'" One cost borne by an existing employee when a new employee is brought in at a higher wage is that
the employee regrets not having sought alternative employment at an earlier date. An altruistic ¯rm might
want to spare its employee this regret cost, and one way of doing so is to maintain a rigid wage structure. It
is also worth noting that one of the issues that led to the unsafe tires discussed in Krueger and Mas (2004)
was the attempt by Firestone to lower the wages of new employees by 30 percent.
8Unemployed people are assumed to meet open vacancies randomly. Letting vt denote the
total vacancies posted by ¯rms at t, the total number of meetings between the unemployed
at t ¡ 1 and ¯rms at t can be expressed as
m
u
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This equation does not include a constant because the level of vacancies can be nor-
malized, rendering this constant unnecessary. This is identical to the matching function in
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). I assume that the nonpecuniary utility of a particular
individual at a job x
ij
t is independently distributed over time and independent across indi-
viduals. This means that, as long as the equilibrium wage wt and the lowest possible level
of x on the job (xe) satisfy
(wt)1¡°
1 ¡ °
+ xe >
(Cu)1¡°
1 ¡ °
+ xu;
any person who meets an open vacancy chooses to become employed. Assuming a constant
rate s at which workers leave jobs for unemployment,8 the meeting function (13) implies that
employment evolves according to
ht = (1 ¡ s)ht¡1 + ut¡1
Ã
vt
ut¡1
!´
: (14)
Analogously to the meetings function for unemployed individuals, the number of meetings
at t between employers and people who were employed at t ¡ 1 can be written as
m
h
t = ¹ mht¡1
Ã
vt
ht¡1
!`
; (15)
where ¹ m and ` are constants.
The number of meetings that ¯rm i has with potential new employees is governed by
the ratio of its own vacancies to the total number of vacancies. Firm i's total number of
8The use of a constant separation probability s simpli¯es the analysis. In the United States, this separation
rate does tend to rise somewhat in recessions. As a result, (14) overstates the extent to which vacancies need
to rise in booms if ´ is calibrated to match the relationship between the exit rate from unemployment and
the v=u ratio, as in Shimer (2005). As I discuss below, this leads me to use Mortensen and Nagyp¶ al's (2005)
value for ´.
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where the second equality uses (13). Let ~ mdi
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ees who meet new potential employers at t. The probability that a particular employee
will encounter a potential employer ought not to depend on his original employer's size.
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The approximation in the second line is valid when each ¯rm represents only a small fraction
of total employment, because this situation implies that the product of vi
t=vt and hi
t=ht is
vanishingly small.
An individual k who worked for ¯rm i at t ¡ 1 and meets ¯rm j at t can decide whether
to stay at i or join j. He stays if he expects
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I assume all ¯rms face the same cost and demand conditions and seek a symmetric
equilibrium where all ¯rms o®er the same wage. I thus assume that workers expect all ¯rms
to o®er the same wage in the future, and I compute conditions under which ¯rms also desire
to do so today. Since xik
t and x
jk
t are independently and identically distributed over time, a
worker k at ¯rm i with a job prospect at ¯rm j stays at ¯rm i if
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10Otherwise, he leaves. Let F be the pdf for [x
jk
t ¡ xik
t ]. Since the xs are drawn from the
same distribution, the resulting density must be symmetric, so that F(y) = 1¡F(¡y). The
probability that a worker who can earn a wage wi
t at ¯rm i and a wage of w
j
t at ¯rm j
remains at ¯rm i is then
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Assume for the moment that all ¯rms other than i pay the wage ~ wt at t. The number of
employees of ¯rm i at time t is then
h
i
t = (1 ¡ s)h
i
t¡1 + ~ m
ui
t ¡ ~ m
di
t + (~ m
di
t + ~ m
ai
t )F
Ã
(wi
t)1¡° ¡ (~ wt)1¡°
1 ¡ °
!
= (1 ¡ s)h
i
t¡1 ¡
hi
t¡1
ht¡1
(1 ¡ F
i
t)m
h
t +
vi
t
vt
(F
i
tm
h
t + m
u
t): (21)
The second equality uses (16), (18), and (17) to replace mui
t , mai
t , and mdi
t , respectively, and
uses F i
t to denote F([(wi
t)1¡° ¡ (~ wt)1¡°]=[1 ¡ °]).
I now study the pro¯t-maximizing choices of wage and vacancy rates. To carry out this
analysis, I use (10) and (11) to rewrite the expected present value of pro¯ts as
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Since the ¯rm is unable to in°uence workers' beliefs concerning future wages, its choice
of wi
t+j and vi
t+j a®ects pro¯ts only from t + j onwards. It follows from (22) that, if the
¯rm were able to choose the state-contingent levels of future wages and vacancies at t, it
would choose the same levels as would be chosen at future dates. The time-consistency of
the ¯rm's problem implies that an optimizing ¯rm at t should not be able to increase ¦i
t by
varying wi
t, vi
t, and vi
t+1, while keeping constant its plan for future levels of the his. For the
state contingent value of hi
t+1 to stay the same in spite of changes in wages and vacancies
at t, vacancies at t + 1 must respond. Equation (21) can be used to compute the requisite
variation in vi
t+1. This is given by
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11Using this expression to substitute for vi
t+1 in (22), the ¯rm's objective function becomes
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For any contingent plans concerning wi
t+j and hi
t+j, an optimizing form must satisfy the
following ¯rst-order conditions with respect to vi
t and wi
t:
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In these equations, d¦i
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t represents the derivative of the expression in (24) with respect
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t, so this derivative holds constant future plans for employment and wages. Equation
(24) implies that
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Because I consider the possibility that the vacancy cost function · is concave, it is
particularly important to check the second-order conditions with respect to vacancies. These
conditions are necessary to prevent ¯rms from preferring an oscillation between high and low
vacancy levels, which lowers average recruitment costs when ·00 < 0. Since the left-hand side
of (25) represents the derivative of pro¯ts with respect to vacancies, the second derivative of
pro¯ts with respect to vacancies can be obtained by di®erentiating this expression:
d2¦t
dvi2
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dhi2
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t
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t
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12This second derivative must be negative for the second-order condition to be satis¯ed.
As shown in Appendix 2, this condition reduces to
d2Ri
t
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t)2 < ·
00 1 + ½[1 ¡ s ¡ (¹ m=2)(vt+1=ht)`]2
[(¹ m=2)(vt=ht¡1)`¡1 + (ut=ht¡1)´¡1]2 (31)
at a symmetric steady state.
Combining (25) and (26) to eliminate d¦i
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t, we have
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This equation admits of a solution where employment, wages, and vacancies at t are the
same for all ¯rms (equal to ht;wt, and vt, respectively). At this symmetric solution, F i
t must
be equal to F(0), and, since F(y) = 1 ¡ F(¡y), F(0) = 1=2. Using ¹ F 0 to denote the value
of F 0(0), (32) becomes
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Also, letting dRt=dht denote the common value of dRi
t=dhi
t, (25) becomes
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The symmetric equilibrium values of wt, vt, ht, and ut must thus satisfy the four equations
(12), (14), (33), and (34). As long as the total number of ¯rms is normalized to equal one,
aggregate sales at this equilibrium Yt equal the sales of each individual ¯rm.
One interesting special case occurs when workers have a constant marginal utility of
income, so ° = 0. In this case, (33) determines the level of vacancies at t for a given level
of past employment ht¡1. Thus, employment is una®ected by dR=dh, the extent to which
¯rms bene¯t from an additional employee. Rather, (34) implies that changes in dR=dh are
simply re°ected in wage changes.
Given that workers consume all of their income, the parameter ° does not a®ect in-
tertemporal choices. It does, however, a®ect the relationship between the individual's wage
13(or income) and the number of dollars an individual is willing to give up for an additional
unit of nonpecuniary consumption. When ° = 0, the wage has no e®ect on this number.
From the point of view of ¯rms, this means that the number of additional workers that
¯rms retain by raising the wage by one dollar is independent of the equilibrium wage and
depends only on the tightness of the labor market. At the same time, the number of extra
workers that ¯rms attracts by posting an additional vacancy also depends on the tightness
of the labor market. Thus, the requirement that the ¯rm be indi®erent between attracting
an additional worker through extra vacancies and attracting the worker by raising the wage
determines the equilibrium level of labor market tightness and thus the level of employment.
2 Required Firm Altruism
One attractive feature of the monopsony model just described is that wages are clearly set by
¯rms, so workers are able to their employer's attitude from the wages she pays. Workers are,
in particular, able to form an opinion about the altruism of their employer. This ¯ts both
with common parlance (where the term \good employer" is often used) and with the model
of Rotemberg (2007a).9 In that model, the people who are a®ected by a decision use their
information to assess the altruism of the decision-maker. If the a®ected party can reject the
hypothesis that the decision-maker is minimally altruistic, he becomes angry. In other words,
his utility function changes so that he now derives utility from harming the decision-maker.
The opportunities available for workers to harm their employers are quite numerous, since
workers have ready access to their employers' assets. Indeed, workers have been observed to
cause losses to their employers on several occasions. Krueger and Mas (2004), for instance,
show that unhappy workers at a plant in Decatur were disproportionately to blame for the
defective Firestone tires that were linked to Ford Explorer rollovers.10
As discussed earlier, the idea that ¯rms wish to be perceived as altruistic towards their
workers ¯ts with numerous corporate mission statements. One might imagine that people
9Typing \good employer" in Google returns about 250,000 hits.
10See Rotemberg (2006) for further examples of harm caused by angry employees including wildcat strikes
and increases in employee theft.
14expect ¯rms to be di®erentially altruistic towards di®erent employees, with particularly high
altruism reserved for employees who have been at the ¯rm longer. While it is subject to
alternate interpretations, the use of seniority to determine who should be laid o® might be
ascribable in part to a desire by ¯rms to appear as if they cared more for employees with more
seniority. Some evidence that is somewhat consistent with this interpretation is provided by
Lee (2004). He points out that seniority rules for layo®s were introduced historically in the
United States at the request of workers, who viewed these rules as being fairer than those
that employers had used earlier.
I thus consider both the case where ¯rms act as if they cared about all employees equally
and the one where they act as if they were directly concerned only with more those that
have already been at the ¯rm in period t ¡ 1. Since I impose the condition that wages have
to be the same for old and new employees, new employees also bene¯t from ¯rm altruism
in this latter case. Let ¯rm i's actual altruism for all employees be denoted by ~ ¸Ai while its
actual altruism for its more senior employees is denoted by ~ ¸Ii. These altruism parameters
are the ¯rm's \types." At each point in time, these are drawn from discrete distributions so
that, with j equal to either A or I, the probability that a ¯rm's altruism ~ ¸ji equals ¹ ¸ at t
equals d
j
t(¹ ¸).
An altruistic ¯rm derives vicarious welfare from the welfare of its employees. To ensure
that this vicarious welfare rises only if the employee is better o® at i than he would be else-
where, I let the utility of altruistic ¯rms depend on the average di®erence between employees'
material welfare at i and the material welfare these employees would have elsewhere. For any
particular employee, this di®erence depends on whether he has access to an alternate o®er
or not. If he does not, his instantaneous material payo®s would equal [(Cu)1¡°=(1¡°)+xu]
if he lost his employment at i. Since the xs are independent across employees, the expected
di®erence for employees at i who do not have access to alternate employment is Ã1i, where
Ã
1i
t =
(wi
t)1¡° ¡ (Cu)1¡°
1 ¡ °
+ ¹ x ¡ xu;
and ¹ x denotes the unconditional mean of x.
15Now consider the welfare gains from having access to the job at i for employees who
also have access to an alternate job with a wage of ¹ wt. It is convenient to consider the
expected gains of an employee before he knows either xi or xj, the nonpecuniary bene¯ts at
the alternate job. At this point, the employee does know that he will remain at i only if (20)
is satis¯ed. His expected gain from also having the job at i can therefore be written as
Ã
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xe g(x
j)
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xj+ ¹ w1¡°
t ¡(wi
t)1¡°
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"
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j
#
g(x
i)dx
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j;
where g is the density of x. Since this individual decides to stay at ¯rm i with probability F i
t
and derives no utility from the job at i if he decides to leave, his expected gain from having
access to i's job, conditional on staying, is Ã21
t =F i
t. This is also the average gain in material
payo®s across the employees who stay and have alternate employment opportunities.
Depending on whether they have access to an alternate o®er or not and whether they are
incumbents at the ¯rm or are new hires, employees fall into four categories. Their respective
contribution to employment can be seen in equation (21), where the ones with outside o®ers
are captured by the terms that include F i
t, while the last full term represents new hires.
Using (13) and (15), the expected material payo® gain of the incumbent employees at time
t from being at ¯rm i is given by ÂIi
t , where
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Adding in the gains of new employees, the expected gains of all employees are given by
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t , where
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It is worth noting for future reference that, while both ÂAi
t and ÂIi
t depend directly on
the ¯rm's employment and wages, only the former also depends directly on the ¯rm's own
16vacancy level. For future use, let !i
t denote the derivative of ÂAi
t with respect to vi
t:
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The sign of this derivative is positive. By increasing vacancies, ¯rm i raises the welfare
of both the unemployed people who thereby obtain jobs and the employed people at other
¯rms who decide to move because ¯rm i o®ers them a better package of wage and nonwage
compensation.
Now imagine that ¯rm i maximizes
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i
t = Et
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¿=0
½
¿~ ¼
i
t+¿; (36)
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In this equation, ¸A and ¸I are the altruism parameters that govern the ¯rm's behavior. As
discussed below, they need not equal the ¯rm's actual altruism parameters. Using the logic
that leads to (24), ~ ¦i
t can be written as
~ ¦
i
t = R
i
t(h
i
t) ¡ w
i
th
i
t ¡ ·(v
i
t) + Et½
2¦
i
t+2(h
i
t+1)
+Et½
Ã
R
i
t+1 ¡ w
i
t+1h
i
t+1 ¡ ·
Ã
vt+1
hi
t+1 ¡ hi
t(1 ¡ s) + (hi
t=ht)(1 ¡ F i
t+1)mh
t+1
F i
t+1mh
t+1 + mu
t+1
!!
+¸
AÂ
Ai
t + ¸
IÂ
Ii
t + Et½(¸
AÂ
Ai
t+1 + ¸
IÂ
Ii
t+1): (38)
The ¯rst-order conditions for the maximization of ~ ¦i
t are
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where dhi
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17In equation (40), the derivative of ÂAi
t with respect to the wage has been set to the marginal
utility of income (wi
t)¡° multiplied by employment hi
t, while the derivative of ÂIi
t with respect
to the wage has been set equal to the expression in curly brackets. The validity of these
substitutions is demonstrated in Appendix 1.
Since the second line of (41) is independent of vi or hi, the expression for the second
derivative of ~ ¦ with respect to v is the same as that for the second derivative of ¦ with
respect to v. Thus, the discussion of second-order conditions for the nonaltruistic case
remains valid here as well. Taking the ratio of (39) and (40), while using (15), (28), and
(29), one obtains
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An increase in ¯rm altruism ¸I lowers the denominator of this expression so that, with
° > 0, wi
t must rise to maintain this equality. Similarly, higher values of ¸A require higher
wages as long as !i
t is small.11 This means that workers obtain information about the
altruism parameter that governs ¯rm behavior from the wage that the ¯rm pays. Following
Rotemberg (2007a), assume that workers care about this parameter and become angry if it
is demonstrably too low. Simplifying Rotemberg (2007a) somewhat, assume that workers'
altruism towards ¯rm i at t is given by the function
»(^ ¸
i
t; ¹ ¸t):
In this function, ^ ¸i represents all the information that workers have about ¯rm i's altruism
parameters, while ¹ ¸ represents the worker's altruism threshold. In general, ^ ¸i need not
be a scalar and can include a wide range of data. Here, I specialize and give workers full
information about the ¯rm's actions and environment.
If, using a test of size ®, the information in ^ ¸i allows workers to reject the hypothesis that
~ ¸Ai (or ~ ¸Ii) is equal to at least ¹ ¸, » is equal to a large negative number. If, instead, workers
11For the parameters considered below, ! is indeed small enough that the right-hand side of (42) rises
with ¸A.
18are unable to reject the (statistical) hypothesis that their employer is minimally benevolent,
» equals zero. Workers thus give employers the bene¯t of the doubt, and this means that it
can be pro¯table for sel¯sh ¯rms to act as if they were altruistic.
A negative » implies that a worker is willing to incur a cost of j»j units in exchange for a
reduction in employer utility of one unit. Given that workers have numerous opportunities
for causing harm to their employers, a large negative » should prove costly to ¯rms. While
I do not model the nature of these costs explicitly, I assume that they equal ¥.
I now turn to the equilibrium determination of wages in the case where ~ ¸Ai = 0 for all
¯rms while ~ ¸Ii has a nondegenerate distribution with dI
t(¹ ¸) = ®. The same arguments apply
to the case where ~ ¸I = 0 for all ¯rms while ~ ¸Ai has a nondegenerate distribution, as long
as !i
t is either negative or small in absolute value, so I do not deal with this case explicitly.
Consider then an allocation where all ¯rms with ~ ¸Ii · ¸¤ set a wage given by (42) with
¸I = ¸¤, and all others set it with ¸I = ~ ¸Ii. It is immediately apparent that, for su±ciently
large ¥, such an allocation cannot be an equilibrium unless ¸¤ ¸ ¹ ¸. If, instead, ¸¤ < ¹ ¸, some
¯rms would pay a wage that corresponds to an altruism level below ¹ ¸, incurring the cost ¥
by identifying themselves as insu±ciently altruistic.
In contrast, allocations where ¸¤ ¸ ¹ ¸ are equilibria as long as ¯rms believe that lower
wages will identify them as having ~ ¸Ii < ¹ ¸. The reason is that a test with size ® does not
reject the hypothesis that ¯rms paying the wage implied by ¸¤ have an altruism parameter
of ¹ ¸. Thus, » is zero for all ¯rms paying this wage. Similarly, the hypothesis is not rejected
for ¯rms whose wage is even higher, because their ~ ¸Ii exceeds ¸¤.
It should be noted that, in the case of ¸¤ > ¹ ¸, the equilibrium beliefs above are not
\reasonable," in the sense that genuinely altruistic ¯rms with ~ ¸Ii = ¹ ¸ would want to pay
a lower wage. These equilibria with excessively high wages can be eliminated under some
additional assumptions. Assume, in particular, that a fraction a of ¯rms with ~ ¸Ii = ¹ ¸
believe that they have already demonstrated their true altruism parameter in other ways,
so they can set any wage they wish without fear of reprisal. Assume, on the other hand,
that workers do not see these additional signals even though they know that some altruistic
19¯rms are naive in the manner just described. Now, consider a ¯rm that deviates from a
proposed equilibrium with ¸¤ > ¹ ¸ by paying the wage that corresponds to ~ ¸Ii = ¹ ¸. Using a
test of size of a®, workers are unable to reject the hypothesis that this ¯rm has an altruism
parameter of ¹ ¸. Thus, at least for this signi¯cance level, workers do not punish such a ¯rm.
This eliminates all equilibria with ¸¤ > ¹ ¸ so the only equilibrium has ¸¤ = ¹ ¸.
The analysis is simpli¯ed by assuming not only that naive altruistic ¯rms are not punished
but by also assuming that no ¯rm has an altruism parameter ~ ¸Ii that strictly exceeds ¹ ¸.
This ensures that the only equilibrium is symmetric, with all ¯rms acting as if ¸I in (42)
were equal to ¹ ¸. As discussed above, a similar analysis applies when ~ ¸Ii = 0 for all ¯rms
while ~ ¸Ai varies. I focus on outcomes where only one of the ¸js is zero, while the other is
equal to ¸
j
t, with j equal to A or I. At symmetric equilibria of this type, (42) becomes
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This equation obviously reduces to (33) when both ¸A
t and ¸I
t equal zero. At a symmetric
equilibrium Ã2 is constant, and (39) implies
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which is the analogue of (34) in the case where ¯rms act altruistically. In this equation,
increases in ¸A and ¸I reduce the marginal revenue product of labor for a given wage and
recruitment cost. Since an altruistic ¯rm derives utility from its employment, it hires more
workers than a sel¯sh ¯rm and thereby reduces its marginal revenue product.
Equations (43) and (44) go beyond the previous analysis in two ways. First, they add
time subscripts to the altruism parameters ¸A and ¸I. For these parameters to be varying
for all ¯rms at the same time, one would have to assume that workers form new judgments
about their employers in each period and that their required level of altruism (as well as
20the altruism of the most altruistic ¯rms) is time varying. The implications of these rather
strong assumptions are considered further below.
Second, (44) assumes that the number of employees and the number of vacancies posted
are also used as signals of a ¯rm's altruism. This is consistent with the full information
assumptions I have made, though the dependence of current vacancies on the expected
future altruism of the ¯rm raises the question of whether workers at time t insist that this
altruism be equal to their current or their expected future ¹ ¸. A second complication with
letting workers base their altruism judgments on the level of vacancies is that, while the wage
in (42) depends only on overall labor market conditions and the ¯rm's share of employment
and vacancies, the level of vacancies also depends on the productive opportunities available
to the ¯rm. Workers' information about these opportunities is likely to be much poorer
than that of employers, and workers may thus be unable to use vacancy data e®ectively to
judge a ¯rm's altruism. While a full analysis of this informational di±culty is beyond the
scope of this paper, I consider a simple alternative where ¯rms set vacancies at the pro¯t-
maximizing level. In other words, all the ¸ parameters in (44) are set equal to zero. This
yields a good approximation to the equilibrium where ¯rms choose their vacancies without
being concerned with worker reactions, as long as most ¯rms are indeed sel¯sh (so that the
number of truly altruistic ¯rms is fairly small).
3 Choice of Parameters
A disadvantage of this model relative to the Mortensen-Pissarides model is that more of
its parameters seem di±cult to calibrate on the basis of microeconomic or steady-state
observations. The parameters of the model are ½, ´, °, s, ¹ m, `, ¹ F 0, and Ã2, while the
variables are u, h, v, w, dR=dh, ·0, !, Ã1, ¸A, and ¸I. To study the e®ect of shocks, one
must calibrate the steady-state value of many of these variables. Both the baseline and some
alternative values for the relevant parameters are displayed in Table 1.
One purpose of studying a model with minimal altruism is to ascertain whether relatively
small degrees of altruism (or of altruism variation) can produce important consequences.
21Thus, my baseline assumes that ¯rms are sel¯sh, so ¸A = ¸I = 0. I then compare the
results of this baseline with the situation where, on average, either ¸A or ¸I is equal to 0.4.
While this is a nontrivial level of altruism, it is important to stress that it would not lead
an employer to be willing to donate money to employees without receiving something in
return. Employers would, however, be willing to give a dollar to their employees if this led
the employees to receive $2.50.
I treat the length of the period as being equal to one month and therefore choose ½ =
0:996, as in Shimer (2005). I also follow Shimer (2005) and set s = 0:034. According to
Shimer (2005), the average job-¯nding rate for the unemployed is 0.45. This should equal
the steady-state value of (v=u)´. Using (12) and (14), this implies that the steady-state rate
of unemployment is s=(s + (v=u)´). Knowing ´ as well as the steady-state job-¯nding rate
(v=u)´, this formula for steady-state unemployment allows one to compute the steady-state
value of vacancies.
Shimer (2005) and Mortensen and Nagyp¶ al (2005) calibrate the parameter ´ rather dif-
ferently, with the former choosing a value of 0.28, and the latter a value of 0.54. In e®ect,
Shimer (2005) uses the regression coe±cient of the vacancy-unemployment ratio on the job-
¯nding rate as his estimate of 1=´, so he is treating the equality between the ¯nding rate and
(v=u)´ as an estimating equation. Mortensen and Nagyp¶ al (2005) calibrate this parameter
instead by considering the regression of vacancies on the unemployment rate itself. This
second regression is essentially equivalent to a regression of v=u on the ¯nding rate, where
the ¯nding rate is measured in such a way that its movements rationalize all unemployment
°uctuations. Since this relationship would require that the ¯nding rate be somewhat more
procyclical than it actually is, the resulting estimate of 1=´ is smaller, and the estimated
value of ´ larger. I adopt the value of 0.54 in this paper, because, by capturing the magnitude
of the rise in vacancies resulting from a rise in employment, this parameter value is likely to
re°ect more accurately the extent to which the marginal cost of hiring rises in booms.
Because I am unaware of estimates of the matching function of the currently employed
with new employers, I set ` = ´, so the elasticity of this matching function with respect
22to vacancies is the same as the corresponding elasticity of matching between ¯rms and
unemployed workers. The constant ¹ m is based on Nagyp¶ al (2005), who shows that the
total volume of job-to-job transitions is equal to about twice the number of people who
become unemployed by separating from their employer. At a symmetric equilibrium, half
the workers who ¯nd alternate employment accept it. This means that the total number of
matches between employed workers and potential future employers, which equal ¹ mh(v=h)`,
should equal 4s. This pins down ¹ m, because the calculations above provide the steady-state
values of h and v.
Silva and Toledo (2006) use micro evidence to obtain an estimate of the average cost of
recruiting one worker. Their cost estimate is about 0.12 times the amount the individual
is paid in one month, and I thus set ·0=w(dh=dv) equal to this value. Given the lack of
absolute measures of ·0, Ã, and dR=dh, observations of the steady-state wage w do not help
to determine the parameters in (34) or in (44). Similarly, because the absolute value of
·0 is unobservable, the observability of the steady-state w does not help to determine any
parameters that appear in (33) or in (43). Therefore, I normalize this average wage and set
it equal to 1.
As in Rotemberg (2007b), I let marginal vacancy costs depend on the level of vacancies.
I consider, in particular, the recruitment cost-function
·(v
i
t) = ·0(v
i
t)
³v;
where the standard constant-cost case obtains when ³v = 1. Rotemberg (2007b) argues that
the assumption that the vacancy-posting function has increasing returns to scale (so ³v < 1)
makes it easier to rationalize the cyclical behavior of wages with the Mortensen-Pissarides
(1994) model. In the United States, vacancies rise sharply in booms, increasing marginal
recruitment costs considerably when ³v = 1. With such a big increase in recruitment costs,
workers are in a particularly strong bargaining position in booms, because their employer
has more to lose from their departure. As a result, wages must rise strongly as well. With
³v smaller than 1, recruitment costs rises more modestly, and hence wage increases are more
23muted. I thus consider both ³v = 1 and ³v = 0:66. This latter value is presented mainly for
illustration.
When ³v < 1, ·00 < 0 and it becomes important to check the second-order conditions
because the concavity R with respect to h no longer su±ces to guarantee this condition. As
can be seen in (31), what is needed in this case is that d2R=dh2 be smaller than a negative
number that depends on k00. I now discuss the parameters that are needed to satisfy this
condition. With ³v = 0:66 and the values of the parameters chosen so far, the right-hand
side of (31) is equal to -0.71. To compute the left-hand side, one must make more speci¯c
assumptions about the production function and the demand conditions facing the typical
¯rm.
Assume the ¯rm's production function f(h) in (8) is given by h® ¡©, where © is a ¯xed
cost. Using (9), the marginal revenue product at a steady-state equals
¹ A[h
® ¡ ©]
¡1=²h
®¡1;
where ² is the elasticity of demand at the steady state and the constant ¹ A must be chosen
so the steady-state version of (44) is satis¯ed. When ¸A = ¸I = 0, ² = 3, ® = 0:66, and
©=h® = 1=3, the left-hand side of inequality (31) equals about -0.76, so (31) is satis¯ed. The
inequality is violated, however, if the elasticity of demand is made arbitrarily large and ¯xed
costs are set to zero.12
These production and demand parameters do not have a direct e®ect on the comovement
of employment and wages in the case where these variables are a®ected only by exogenous
changes in dR=dg. The reason is that, in this model, °uctuations in the marginal revenue
product of labor have the same e®ect on h and w regardless of whether they are due to
changes in technology z or changes in the elasticity of demand ². On the other hand, the size
of the changes in z or ² that are needed to justify these changes in dR=dh does depend on
demand and production function parameters. Another reason to calibrate these parameters is
that they are necessary to obtain implications regarding the movement of labor productivity.
12Setting either ¸A or ¸I equal to 0.4 changes the ¹ A that satis¯es (44). However, the e®ect of this on the
left-hand side of (31) is negligible for the baseline parameters.
24It must be pointed out, however, that the predicted movements in labor productivity
depend also on whether the movements in dR=dh are due to changes in z or to changes
in ². Indeed, in the case where employment changes are due exclusively to changes in ²,
setting ® = 0:66 and ©=h® = 0:4 leads the predicted comovement of labor productivity and
employment to resemble | in certain respects | the observed comovement in the United
States. As reported in Rotemberg (2007b), the regression coe±cient of a detrended measure
of U.S. output on a detrended measure of employment has a coe±cient of about 1.1. Using
the production function above, a 1 percent increase in h leads to a ®=(1 ¡ ©=h®) percent
change in output. Thus, the parameters just mentioned lead output to rise by the correct
percentage in response to a typical increase in employment. Unfortunately, the correlation
between labor productivity and employment is relatively low in the United States so changes
in ² cannot explain all the movements in labor productivity. A more promising approach is
to let productivity be a®ected by a variety of shocks, including changes in ² and z. With
a smaller value of ©=h®, the former impulse would lead to movements in productivity that
are more countercyclical than the average movements that are observed empirically, while
the latter generally leads to movements that are more procyclical. This decomposition of
productivity movements is beyond the scope of this paper, however.
The calibration of production and demand parameters is even more important if one
considers changes in ¯rms' required levels of altruism. An increase in required altruism
always raises real wages. However, the e®ect of this increase in real wages on the quantity
of labor demanded depends on ®, ², and ©. My baseline calibration for these parameters is
® = 0:75, ² = 3 and © = 0:2.
Survey evidence may someday be used to clarify how much typical workers value their
jobs as opposed to the alternative uses of their time. This knowledge might then allow one
to calibrate Ã1 (the steady-state level of Ã1
t) and Ã2. So far, however, the existing evidence
on them is fairly scant. In the case where ¸A = 0 and ¸I ¸ 0, !t does not a®ect (43), so
this equation links the tightness of the labor market with real wages in a manner that is
independent of Ã1 and Ã2. It then follows that these parameters do not a®ect the relative
25movements of wages and employment when both are being driven by changes in dR=dh. On
the other hand, Ã1 and Ã2 have large e®ects on (44) and thus on the vacancy choices of
altruistic ¯rms. To keep this in°uence small, I set these parameters to relatively low values.
Given the parameters chosen so far, one can compute the derivative of the pdf of nonpe-
cuniary bene¯ts on the job ¹ F 0 by using the steady-state version of (43). Because the wage
has been normalized to equal 1, this parameter is independent of ° and depends only on ·0,
on the ¸s and Ãs, and on the parameters governing the matching of workers to ¯rms. Using
the parameters just described, ¹ F 0 equals 28.5, 19.7, and 18.3, depending on, respectively,
whether both ¸s are set to zero, ¸A = 0:4 (with ¸I = 0), or ¸I = 0:4 (with ¸A = 0). To gain
an idea of the implications of the value of ¹ F 0, it is worth considering only workers who have
an outside o®er and computing the elasticity of their departure with respect to the wage.
For w = 1, this elasticity is given by ¹ F 0=F(0). Thus, the above values of ¹ F 0 imply elasticities
greater than 36, which seem rather large.
The implied value of ¹ F 0 is large primarily because ·0 is relatively small. A low ·0 indicates
that wages are large relative to recruiting costs, and in this monopsony model this can be
rationalized only if employees are quite sensitive to wages when choosing whether to stay or
leave. This requires, in turn, that there be a large number of ¯rms whose nonwage features
are comparable with those o®ered by any given employer, and this corresponds to a high ¹ F 0.
This leaves the parameter °, which governs both the substitutability of wage and nonwage
components of a job and the speed at which the marginal utility of income declines with
income. While it is standard to assume log utility ° = 1, the consumption commitments
model of Chetty and Szeidl (2007) can rationalize higher values. I therefore consider a
variety of values, with an eye towards understanding which values of ° ¯t most easily with
the observed labor market dynamics.
4 Results of Simulations
I consider two di®erent types of simulations. In the ¯rst, there are °uctuations in dR=dh
that induce °uctuations in h and w. In the second, there are simultaneous °uctuations in
26dR=dh and in either ¸A or ¸I. The ¯rst type is more similar to the exercise carried out
in Shimer (2005), where there is a single exogenous variable (technology in his case), and
the issue is how well the model reproduces certain features of the data. Shimer (2005) is
particularly concerned with reproducing the cyclical movements in productivity, but, as I
have just discussed, these hinge crucially on the underlying causes of the movements in
dR=dh. I therefore focus only on the relationship between real wages and employment.
To obtain some analogues of the moments predicted by the model, I detrend monthly
data on the logarithms of total U.S. civilian employment and of the ratio of hourly earnings
of production workers in manufacturing to the consumer price index (CPI). These series are
detrended using the method of Rotemberg (1999), which is designed to keep the covariance
of the detrended value of the series at t and t¡k low, while also ensuring that the detrended
value of a series at t is orthogonal to the di®erence between the trend at t and the average
of the trend at t + v and t ¡ v. Because the series are monthly, k is set equal to 48, while
v is set equal to 15.13 In practice, this method is essentially a band-pass ¯lter that di®ers
from Hodrick-Prescott in that only relatively low frequencies are allowed into the trend.
I use data from January 1948 to August 2006. Because the removal of a smooth, two-
sided trend implies that detrended observations near the edges of the sample are inaccurate, I
trim ¯ve years of data from the beginning and the end of the series. The resulting detrended
real wage is fairly procyclical, and has a correlation of 0.41 with detrended employment.
Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) suggest that CPI-de°ated hourly earnings are particularly
procyclical relative to other aggregate real wage series. While these series may be somewhat
atypical, the exercise of mimicking their joint movements with the present model should also
be informative about the capacity of the model to match the movements in related series.
When I consider the e®ects of a single shock, I am mostly concerned with ascertaining the
model's capacity to match the \regression coe±cient" of wages on employment. As can be
seen in Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995), statistics of this sort are often used to summarize
the extent to which real wages are procyclical. In the two series just discussed, this regression
13These are three times larger than the parameters Rotemberg (1999) recommends for quarterly data.
27coe±cient equals 0.49. It is slightly larger than the correlation between the series because
the standard deviation of detrended wages is slightly larger than the standard deviation of
detrended employment. The former equals 0.017 while the latter equals 0.014.
Since the model seeks to explain the movements of employment by the movements of
a single exogenous series, it is actually simpler to postulate a stochastic process for the
detrended employment series and then derive the implied movements in dR=dh. Given that
the ¯rst-order serial correlation of detrended employment equals 0.97, let the log of detrended
employment follow
~ ht = 0:97~ ht¡1 + e
h
t; (45)
where ~ ht is the log di®erence between employment and steady-state employment, while eh
t
is an i.i.d. random variable. In the interest of matching the behavior of actual series, let
the standard deviation of eh
t be equal to 0.0036. This equals the standard error of the
autoregression reported above.
The four equilibrium conditions | (12), (14), (43) and (44) | can then be solved using
Dynare. The model's predicted regression coe±cients for several di®erent values of the
parameters are reported in Table 2. In addition to reporting regression coe±cients of the
log of w on the log of h, Table 2 also reports coe±cients from the regression of the log of
dR=dh on h. These give an idea of the extent to which the model needs \large impulses" to
generate realistic movements in employment. It is important to note that, by themselves,
increases in h lower the marginal revenue product of labor, so the exogenous rise in dR=dh
that raises employment must be larger than the actual increase reported in Table 2.
With the baseline parameters of ° = ³v = 1, the model implies extremely large procyclical
movements in real wages and dR=dh. This shows that this monopsony-based model can also
be subject to the di±culties uncovered by Shimer (2005). Even with sel¯sh ¯rms, it is
possible to ameliorate these problems signi¯cantly by increasing ° and lowering ³v.
Equation (43) requires that the cost of attracting a worker by raising wages be the same
as the cost of doing so by increasing vacancies. In booms, the cost of attracting a worker
through vacancies rises. The higher is °, the more the marginal utility of income falls for
28workers when the wage rises. This implies that increases in wages are less e®ective as a
recruiting tool when wages are already high, so the cost of increasing employment by raising
wages rises with the wage rate. As a result, wages do not have to rise as much in booms for
them to become as costly as increases in vacancies as a recruiting tool.
The e®ect of ° on the extent to which wages are procyclical is opposite here to the e®ect
in the standard market-clearing model of the labor market. In that model, a higher ° means
that the marginal utility of consumption falls more in booms, so the wage needs to rise more
to keep people indi®erent between their old hours of work and slight increases in their hours
of work. Interestingly, the reduction in the marginal utility of income that occurs in booms
plays a role here as well, but here the e®ect is to discourage ¯rms from using wage increases
to retain and recruit employees.
Table 2 also shows that the extent to which dR=dh must rise to induce increases in
employment is quite comparable to the rise in wages that accompanies this employment
increase. Equation (43) determines wages from the degree of tightness in the labor market,
without much regard for dR=dh. Equation (44), on the other hand, makes it clear that
¯rms would not be willing to let the labor market become tight (which increases the cost of
recruiting with vacancies) unless dR=dh rose by essentially the same amount as wages.
The last eight lines of the table show that required ¯rm altruism can dampen the needed
changes in wages considerably. Indeed, for ° = 8, ³v = 0:66, the model nearly reproduces the
regression coe±cient of wages on employment obtained when either ¸A or ¸I = 0:4. Firm
altruism has a number of e®ects that tend to make real wages less procyclical. First, increases
in wages lower workers' marginal utility of consumption w¡°, and this decrease lowers an
altruistic ¯rm's vicarious bene¯t from raising wages. This particular e®ect is larger when
¸A = 0:4 than when ¸I = 0:4 because, in the former case, the reduction in the marginal
utility of income a®ects more people that the ¯rm cares about.
Second, an increase in h lowers the fraction of more senior employees because it is asso-
ciated with a rise in v=h, which leads to more turnover. This means that a ¯rm's vicarious
bene¯t from the utility of workers is smaller in booms, when ¸A = 0 and ¸I > 0. Such a
29¯rm is thus less inclined to raise wages in economic expansions. However, this dampening
of real wage increases is only valid when ¯rms care disproportionately about more senior
employees.
Third, increases in wages raise the utility of being employed relative to the utility of
being unemployed, thus raising Ã1
t and thereby increasing !t. For a ¯rm with ¸A > 0, this
increase in ! raises the attractiveness of increasing employment via vacancies rather than
via wages. This dampens the incentive of such a ¯rm to raise wages. This e®ect turns out
to be quantitatively important and implies that wages are dampened more with ¸A = 0:4
than with ¸I = 0:4.
The dampening of wage movements suggests that a model with positive ¹ ¸ ¯ts with the
interview evidence of Bewley (1999) in the sense that wages do not decline more in recessions
in part because ¯rms are worried about appearing su±ciently altruistic. Admittedly, one
reason that altruism matters here is that workers' marginal utility of income varies over time,
and the extent of this variation may be controversial. There are, however, two reasons to
imagine that this variation might well be substantial. First, as Chetty and Szeidl (2007) have
emphasized, most workers have considerable consumption commitments that are di±cult to
unwind. This means that small reductions in disposable income can trigger large changes in
the elements of consumption that can be freely varied. The result is that the marginal utility
of consumption can fall dramatically even when income falls only by a small amount.14
There is also a second reason for the marginal utility of income to vary substantially, which
has not been widely considered in the macro literature. This is the existence of altruistic
transfers within families and across friendship networks. In recessions, the unemployment
rate rises and employed workers can be expected to give up more of their paycheck to people
they know who have lost their jobs. This, presumably, ought to raise the marginal utility
of income of employed workers by more than is implied by the reduction in their wage. If,
14Formally, this would require consumption in (1) to be equal to the wage minus the level of consumption
commitments ¹ C. The expression w
¡°
t in equations such as (44) must then be replaced by (wt ¡ ¹ C)¡°. For
this expression to rise by 1 percent requires a smaller percentage change in the wage than is required to
increase w
¡°
t by 1 percent. The wage changes that are needed to balance changes in labor market tightness
are thus smaller when ° is larger.
30for example, a spouse loses his or her job, the marginal utility of income of the spouse who
remains employed is presumably much larger.
The importance of variations in the marginal utility of income for the conclusion that
¯rms smooth wages connects this model with models where observed wages are smooth be-
cause ¯rms explicitly insure workers against income °uctuations. One di®erence between
these two approaches is that I rule out binding long-term contracts in my analysis, in part
because such contracts are quite rare among workers who occasionally experience unemploy-
ment. Contracts may, of course, be implicit as in the classic analysis of Azariadis (1975),
although this formulation raises the question of how these contracts are enforced. One way
of thinking about the model of this paper is that workers' capacity for anger at insu±cient
altruism provides an enforcement mechanism that allows for a certain degree of insurance,
though the details of this insurance are not identical to those of implicit-contracts models.
So far, I have treated the required altruism levels as ¯xed. One reason to study models
where ¹ ¸, and thus ¸A or ¸I, °uctuate is that the addition of such °uctuations to a model
with variable dR=dh adds a force that can make real wages countercyclical, reducing the
correlation between wages and employment. This potential source of countercyclical wage
movements is worth contrasting with the more standard idea that there are movements in
labor supply. Traditional labor supply shifts can be due either to preference shifts, as in Hall
(1997), or to wealth e®ects. As an example of the latter, increases in government purchases
reduce people's wealth in standard models and increase their willingness to work at a given
real wage. Similarly, the expectation of future technical progress makes people feel wealthier
and reduces their willingness to work at a given real wage.
In matching models of the sort I have considered, these traditional movements in labor
supply tend to have a counterfactual implication. When people increase their willingness to
work at a given real wage, a matching model tends to predict an initial rise in unemployment
as more people seek work. This increase in unemployment leads to eventual increases in
employment (by increasing the number of workers who become matched to employers), even
without an increase in vacancies. The result is that vacancies and unemployment are no
31longer as negatively correlated as they would be if the only changes were changes in labor
demand. Thus, matching models that include a labor supply channel, such as Merz (1995),
do not have a Beveridge curve where, as in U.S. data, the negative correlation between
vacancies and unemployment is nearly perfect.
In contrast, the model in this paper abstracts from labor supply variations by assuming
that the labor force is ¯xed. The combination of (12) and (14) implies that all movements
of employment lie on a Beveridge curve. This is not to say that changes in wealth cannot
play any role. Perceived increases in ¯rm wealth, for example, may lead people to expect a
higher ¹ ¸ and thereby increase real wages for any given level of employment. Drawing out this
connection is beyond the scope of this paper, however. Here, I simply consider exogenous
variations in ¹ ¸. To simplify, I assume that ¹ ¸ follows the AR(1) process:
¹ ¸t = 0:96¹ ¸t¡1 + e
¸
t; (46)
where e¸ is an i.i.d. random variable. The choice of the AR parameter is broadly dictated
by a desire to match the serial correlation of employment, though the correspondence is not
exact. One aim of the analysis is to study whether the standard deviation of ¹ ¸ needed to
explain the broad features of employment and wage °uctuations is excessive. To make the
results transparent, I report the standard deviation of ¹ ¸, which I denote by ¾¸, rather than
reporting the standard deviation of e¸.
In addition to °uctuations in ¹ ¸, I continue to let dR=dh be subject to cyclical °uctuations.
Note that the existence of diminishing returns implies that dR=dh falls whenever reductions
in ¹ ¸ lead to rises in employment. I thus introduce a variable d dR=dht, which is the level of
dRt=dht that would be induced by the current level of employment if ² and z were at their
steady-state levels. One can then write dRt=dht as
dRt
dht
=
d dRt
dht
+
dR
dh
g dRt
dht
;
where dR=dh is the steady-state value of dR=dh and g dR=dh represents the e®ects of exoge-
32nous variations in z and ². Assume further that the exogenous changes in dR=dh satisfy
g dRt
dht
= 0:96
g dRt¡1
dht¡1
+ e
R
t ; (47)
where eR
t is i.i.d. and independent of e¸ at all leads and lags. I let ¾R denote the standard
deviation of g dR=dht induced by eR
t .
The results of using Dynare to simulate this model for various parameters are reported in
Table 3. The ¯rst line of this table reports the standard deviations of cyclical employment and
wages as well as their correlation in the U.S. data discussed earlier. The issue considered here
is whether combinations of the two parameters ¾R and ¾¸ can explain these three moments.
I show that this is not possible for certain model parameters, while it is possible for others.
This is obviously not a full estimation exercise, since many combinations of model parameters
¯t these three moments equally well. Rather, Table 3 provides some guidance as to whether
the parameters that are able to replicate these moments are plausible.
The table is constructed by varying ¾¸ and ¾R so the correlation between detrended
employment and detrended wages equals 0.41 for all the speci¯cations. When ° and ³v
are set at their baseline values of 1, one cannot choose values of ¾¸ and ¾R to account for
the standard deviations of h and w. This can be seen by noting that, for the parameters
reported, one of these predicted standard deviations is larger than the observed one, while
the other is smaller. If one reduces either ¾¸ or ¾R, the other must be lowered as well to
maintain the correlation between h and w. As a result, both the standard deviation of w
and that of h fall, and one of these declines renders the model more counterfactual. The
same argument applies if either ¾¸ or ¾R is increased.
The root cause of this problem is that, as we saw before, the baseline parameters lead
wages to change much more than employment in response to changes in dR=dh. This leads
the standard deviation of wages to be too high relative to the standard deviation of employ-
ment. If one tried to increase the latter relative to the former by raising ¾¸, the correlation
between employment and wages would be too low, so the performance of the model cannot
be improved in this way.
33Letting ° = 8 and ³v = 0:66 comes closer to matching these moments, because, as we
saw, it ensures that dR=dh leads to less procyclical wages. Nonetheless, the moments cannot
be matched exactly. Even more troubling, the ¯t is actually worsened if ° is raised further,
because variations in ¸A around the steady-state value of 0.4 lead to procyclical movements
in real wages when ° ¸ 8:15. The reason for these procyclical movements is that (44) implies
that a more altruistic ¯rm wishes to hire more unemployed people and, all else being equal,
this leads to an increase in vacancies when ¸A rises. A countervailing e®ect, obviously, is
that increases in ¸ lead wages to rise, reducing labor demand. However, this e®ect is weak
when ° is large, so the vacancy-increasing e®ect dominates for su±ciently large °.
As discussed earlier, one might prefer to assume that sel¯sh ¯rms do not increase their
vacancies when ¹ ¸ rises, because, workers inability to observe dR=dh prevent them from using
a ¯rm's hiring level to determine its altruism. One crude way of capturing this informational
imperfection is to set ¸A = ¸I = 0 in (44), and the four last rows of Table 3 show the results
of this approach. In this case, increases in ¹ ¸ still raise wages, but now they unambiguously
lead ¯rms to lower employment. The result is that a lower value of °, namely, ° = 6:5,
su±ces to match all three moments, even when ³v is set to 1.
5 Adding Training Costs
There are several reasons to consider an extension of the model that incorporates post-
recruitment training costs. First, as discussed by Silva and Toledo (2006), these costs appear
to be signi¯cantly larger than the costs of recruitment. Second, Silva and Toledo (2006)
argue that incorporating realistic costs of this type has an important impact on the cyclical
properties of the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model. It therefore seems important to analyze
whether the present model is equally a®ected by the incorporation of training costs.
There are also two reasons to incorporate such costs that relate to the model itself. The
¯rst is that, without training costs, the model has di±culty rationalizing the existence of
wages that are high relative to recruitment costs. It can do so only if the elasticity of worker
departures with respect to the ¯rm's wage is very high. With training costs, the ¯rm has an
34additional reason to fear worker departures, and this rationalizes the payment of relatively
high wages. The second is that concavity in training costs with respect to the number of
workers trained can contribute to satisfying the second-order conditions in the case where
the · function is convex.
To simplify the presentation of this section, I derive equilibrium conditions under the
assumption that the ¯rm is sel¯sh and ¸A = ¸I = 0. Adding the e®ects of altruism to these
equations is straightforward, because these e®ects are captured by the di®erence between
the equations in Section 2 and those in Section 1. The equations that correspond to (43)
and (44) for this combination, which are used in the simulations, are displayed in Appendix
3.
Consider a ¯rm that incurs training costs ¿ that depend on the number of individuals
newly hired by the ¯rm. For ¯rm i, the earlier analysis makes it clear that the number of
people newly hired at t equals hi
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As before, this formulation allows one to hold hi
t+k and wi
t+k for k ¸ 1 constant as one varies
vi
t and wi
t. The resulting ¯rst-order conditions are now
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Note that (49) is identical to (25), whereas (50) di®ers from (26) because raising wages now
has an additional advantage over raising vacancies as a device to increase employment. This
advantage is that the incumbent employees who stay at the ¯rm do not require training and
thus reduce costs by ¿0.
Because (49) is the same as (25), the second derivative of pro¯ts with respect to vi
t can
still be written as (30). For the second-order conditions to be satis¯ed, this second derivative
has to be negative. As shown in Appendix 2, at a symmetric steady state this now requires
that
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which is easier to satisfy if ¿00 > 0.
Combining (49) and (50) to eliminate d¦i
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At a symmetric equilibrium, this becomes
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while symmetry allows (49) to be written as
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36The quantitative analysis of the e®ects of training costs is simpli¯ed by assuming that ¿0
is constant. Silva and Toledo (2006) suggest that the marginal cost of training one individual
worker equals about 13 times the cost of recruiting an additional employee. This implies
that ¿0 = 13·0=(dh=dv); so I calibrate ¿0 in this manner.
Table 4 shows elasticities of wages and dR=dh with respect to employment in a model
where detrended employment is given by (45). Its last column displays ¹ F 0, the density of
F at zero. While it does not vary with °, this density does depend on ¹ ¸. With realistic
training costs, ¹ F 0 is substantially lower than it was in Section 3. Increases in wages now
di®er from vacancies as a method for increasing employment in that some of the employees
obtained by increasing wages do not require training. This leads ¯rms to raise wages (relative
to recruitment costs) and therefore requires a smaller elasticity of employee departures to
ensure that wages are high.
The entries in this table lead to two additional conclusions. The ¯rst is that the elasticities
of wages and dR=dh with respect to employment are reduced relative to those in Table 2,
but the reductions are modest. The intuition for this e®ect of training costs appears to be
somewhat di®erent from that provided in Silva and Toledo (2006) for their bargaining model.
Here, ° > 0 implies that wages become less e®ective as a recruiting device when wages are
increased (because wage and nonwage aspects of jobs are not perfect substitutes). This
means that, when wages are already high in booms, wages are also not very e®ective relative
to vacancies in reducing a ¯rm's training costs for new employees. This further reduces the
¯rm's incentive to raise wages in booms.
To complete the analysis, I now let both ¹ ¸ and d dR=dh vary in the model with training
costs. The stochastic processes for these variables are once again given by (46) and (47),
and the results are displayed in Table 5. As before, the parameters ¾¸ and ¾R are set so
the correlation between the logarithms of w and h equals 0.41. When ° and ³v equal their
baseline values, it remains impossible to match the standard deviations of employment and
wages by varying ¾R and ¾¸. On the other hand it is almost possible to do so while letting
³v = 1 if one raises ° to equal 6. While this value is still substantial, it is lower than what
37was needed in the absence of training costs.
The last four rows of Table 5 show the results of assuming that ¯rms set vacancies sel¯shly,
so that ¸A and ¸I equal zero in (55). With this modi¯cation, which makes real wages more
countercyclical in response to changes in ¹ ¸, it is nearly possible to match the three moments
with a value of ° of only 4. The changes in ¸ that are needed are not trivial, but they are
still low relative to the steady-state value of 0.4. Interestingly, these variations in ¹ ¸ do not
end up explaining a very large fraction of employment °uctuations, most of which remain
accounted for by changes in \labor demand."
6 Conclusion
This paper has shown that parameters can be found in a matching model with monopsonistic
elements that mimic certain aspects of the joint behavior of real wages, employment, and
vacancies in the United States. Interestingly, the performance of this model is enhanced by
assuming that workers require that ¯rms be minimally altruistic. This lends some credence
to the idea that required ¯rm altruism can capture some of the fairness considerations that
employers and workers allude to when discussing wages. Nonetheless, it is important to
note that the model requires nonstandard parameter values in order to explain the standard
deviations of employment and wages as well as their correlation; so further work is needed
to see whether these values are consistent with other observations.
The model is highly stylized, and numerous extensions could help to determine its ap-
plicability. A source of simplicity, but also an important shortcoming of the model, is that
it considers homogeneous ¯rms. Particularly because the business cycle is associated with
di®erences in the rates at which di®erent sectors expand and contract their employment, it
would be useful to develop an analogous theory where wages di®er across ¯rms. Similarly,
the model covers only homogeneous workers and therefore does not make predictions about
wage dispersion within ¯rms. Lastly, the model neglects variations in the extent to which
¯rms lay o® workers over the business cycle, and this, too, seems to be a promising area for
further analysis.
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41Table 1
Calibrated Parameters
Baseline Alts.
½: Discount rate .996
s: Steady-state separation rate into unemployment .034
(v=u)´: Steady-state ¯nding rate for unemployed .45
´: Elasticity of ¯nding rate with respect to v=u .54
`: Elasticity of ¯nding rate with respect to v=h .54
¹ m(v=h)`: Steady-state ¯nding rate for employed .136
¸A, ¸I: Steady-state altruism 0 .4
Ã1: Average welfare gain for unemployed .06
2Ã2: Expected gains from second o®er .06
·0=w(dh=dv): Steady-state recruitment cost in wage units .12
³v: Elasticity of recruiting costs 1 .66
°: Measure of w ¡ x substitutability 1 8
²: Steady-state elasticity of demand 3
®: Exponent on labor in the production function .66
©=h®: Index of returns to scale in production 0.33
42Table 2
Elasticities with respect to employment
Spec. Parameters Elasticity Elasticity
of w of dR=dh
(1) ¸s =0, Log utility (° = 1), Linear · 15.38 15.47
(2) ¸s =0, ° = 8, ³v = 1 1.92 2.18
(3) ¸s =0, ° = 1, ³v = :66 10.64 10.63
(4) ¸s =0, ° = 8, ³v = :66 1.33 1.44
(5) ¸A = :4, Log utility (° = 1), Linear · 5.82 4.06
(6) ¸A = :4,° = 8, ³v = 1 1.15 1.05
(7) ¸A = :4,° = 1, ³v = :66 3.92 2.67
(8) ¸A = :4,° = 8, ³v = :66 0.78 0.64
(9) ¸I = :4, Log utility (° = 1), Linear · 9.67 6.87
(10) ¸I = :4,° = 8, ³v = 1 1.21 1.13
(11) ¸I = :4,° = 1, ³v = :66 6.62 4.63
(12) ¸I = :4,° = 8, ³v = :66 0.83 0.70
43Table 3
The e®ect of independent variations in ¸ and z (or ²)
Spec. Parameters ¾¸ ¾R S.D.(h) S.D.(w) Corr(h,w) Frac.(h)
due to R
U.S. Data .014 .017 .41
Altruistic wages and hiring
(1) ¸A = :4, ° = 1,³v = 1 .089 .025 .007 .034 .41 .58
(2) ¸A = :4, ° = 8,³v = :66 .020 .014 .011 .020 .41 .9998
(3) ¸I = :4, ° = 1,³v = 1 .034 .017 .003 .022 .41 .43
(4) ¸I = :4, ° = 8,³v = :66 .139 .017 .013 .017 .41 .96
Altruistic wages | Sel¯sh hiring
(5) ¸A = :4, ° = 1,³v = 1 .073 .024 .006 .022 .41 .36
(6) ¸A = :4, ° = 6:5,³v = 1 .018 .024 .014 .017 .41 .63
(7) ¸I = :4, ° = 1,³v = 1 .043 .250 .004 .024 .41 .30
(8) ¸I = :4, ° = 6:5,³v = 1 .144 .025 .014 .017 .41 .61
44Table 4
Elasticities with respect to employment with nonzero training costs
Spec. Parameters Elasticity Elasticity ¹ F 0
of w of dR=dh
(1) ¸s=0, ° = 1, ³v = 1 8.29 7.78 3.80
(2) ¸s=0, ° = 8, ³v = 1 1.04 1.67 3.80
(3) ¸s=0, ° = 1, ³v = :66 7.66 7.11 3.80
(4) ¸s=0, ° = 8, ³v = :66 0.96 1.46 3.80
(5) ¸A = :4,° = 1, ³v = 1 4.78 3.43 2.32
(6) ¸A = :4,° = 8, ³v = 1 0.62 1.15 2.32
(7) ¸A = :4,° = 1, ³v = :66 4.41 3.09 2.32
(8) ¸A = :4,° = 8, ³v = :66 0.57 0.98 2.32
(9) ¸I = :4,° = 1, ³v = 1 5.11 3.77 2.44
(10) ¸I = :4,° = 8, ³v = 1 0.64 1.18 2.44
(11) ¸I = :4,° = 1, ³v = :66 4.70 3.39 2.44
(12) ¸I = :4,° = 8, ³v = :66 0.59 1.01 2.44
45Table 5
The e®ect of independent variations in ¸ and z (or ²)
in the presence of training costs
Spec. Parameters ¾¸ ¾R S.D.(h) S.D.(w) Corr(h,w) Frac.(h)
due to R
U.S. Data .014 .017 .41
Altruistic wages and hiring
(1) ¸A = :4, ° = 1 .034 .022 .007 .029 .41 .64
(2) ¸A = :4, ° = 6 .097 .023 .013 .017 .41 .97
(3) ¸I = :4, ° = 1 .038 .023 .007 .030 .41 .62
(4) ¸I = :4, ° = 6 .107 .023 .013 .017 .41 .96
Altruistic wages | Sel¯sh hiring
(5) ¸A = :4, ° = 1 .035 .028 .008 .026 .41 .50
(6) ¸A = :4, ° = 4 .072 .028 .013 .017 .41 .78
(7) ¸I = :4, ° = 1 .007 .026 .007 .026 .41 .49
(8) ¸I = :4, ° = 4 .079 .027 .013 .017 .41 .77
46Appendix 1: The e®ect of wages on Â1 and Â2
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47Appendix 2: Second-order conditions
Consider ¯rst the case without training costs. Di®erentiating (27) while noting that ·0
depends on vi, which in turn is given by (23), we obtain
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Moreover, it follows from (28) that d2hi=dvi2 is equal to zero, meaning that the number
of vacancies a ¯rm must post to hire an additional worker is independent of the number of
people it hires. Using (30), we then have
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This must be negative for the second-order condition to be satis¯ed. At a steady state, this
requires that
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as in (31).
Now turn to the case with training costs. Di®erentiating (51), we obtain
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Since (28) still holds, d2hi=dvi2 remains equal to zero. Thus, (30) now implies
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For this to be negative at a symmetric equilibrium requires that
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48Appendix 3: Equilibrium conditions with altruism and training costs
The equations that correspond to (43) and (44) (or (54) and (55)) are, respectively,
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